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Abstract
Describing the basic properties of road network systems, such as their robust-
ness, vulnerability, and reliability, has been a very important research topic
in the field of urban transportation. Current research mainly uses several sta-
tistical indicators of complex networks to analyze the road network systems.
However, these methods are essentially node-based. These node-based meth-
ods are more concerned with the number of connections between nodes, and
lack of consideration for interactions. So, this leads to the well-known node
paradox problem, and their ability of characterizing the local and intrinsic
properties of a network is weak. From the perspective of network intrinsic
geometry, this paper proposes a method for measuring road network vulner-
ability using a discrete Ricci curvature, which can identify the key sections
of a road network and indicate its fragile elements. The results show that
our method performs better than complex network statistics on measuring
the vulnerability of a road network. Additionally, it can characterize the
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evolution of the road network vulnerability among different periods of time
in the same city through our method. Finally, we compare our method with
the previous method of centrality and show the different between them. This
article provides a new perspective on a geometry to analyze the vulnerability
of a road network and describes the inherent nature of the vulnerability of
a road system from a new perspective. It also contributes to enriching the
analytical methods of complex road networks.
Keywords: Network Geometry, Ricci Curvature, Road Network, Topology
Vulnerability
1. Introduction
Reliable road network and other related infrastructure provide continu-
ous transportation services for modern life. If the network is interrupted, it
will not only impede residents daily travel but also lead to huge repair costs.
For these reasons, ensuring the continuous operation of road networks is an
important research topic. To solve problems posed by interruptions, a key
idea is to measure vulnerability [1], which measures the road networks ability
to function properly in the event of attacks and failures [2]. Vulnerability
denotes the potential factors that contribute to degraded road network and
the maximum serviceable level that can be maintained when the network is
damaged. In essence, the topology determines the performance of a network.
Therefore, the central issue in the study of vulnerability is to investigate the
relationship between the road network topology and road network vulnera-
bility [3, 4, 5, 6].
Road network vulnerability is usually represented by removing certain
elements of a network and comparing the network connectivity before and
after the removal. The removal is usually based on topological indicators of
the road network [7]. Road network topology surveys based on statistical
indicators of complex networks have been a heated topic of debate in recent
years [8, 9, 10]. These indicators are usually node-based methods[11] such as
degree[12], centrality[13], community[14], clustering coefficients[15]. Specifi-
cally, one prominent feature of the node-based approach is that it focuses on
the quantitative characteristics of nodes [11]. For example, the node degree
describes the number of direct connections between nodes, and the between-
ness centrality describes the number of times a node (edge) is passed by the
shortest path.
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The node-based method answers questions about the quantitative aspect
of connections, such as ‘whether there is a connection between nodes A and
B’ or ‘the number of nodes connected to node A’. However, in terms of
describing the interaction of connection, such as ‘how node A connects with
node B’ or ‘how to easily transfer from node A to node B’, is limited. The
essence of the vulnerability survey is to maintain the transmission capacity.
That is, the interaction information between nodes is used as an indicator
of vulnerability that the node-based method cannot provide. In addition,
simply adopting the node-based method may lead to substantial differences
between the model and the real world situation [11]. Studies have shown
that a statistically significant commonality network may exhibit completely
different network properties [16].
Therefore, the latest research of network geometry, Ricci curvature [17,
18], is adopted in this paper to capture the topological characteristics of road
networks. Unlike the node-based method, the Ricci curvature is an edge-
based approach [11]. It measures the transmission status between nodes
through the optimal transmission measure and captures both quantitative
and interactive information. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) From the perspective of Riemannian geometry, we examine the topol-
ogy of the road network, especially the state of topology transmission,
through the Ricci curvature method. This method helps us understand
the relationship between road network topology and vulnerability.
(2) The large amount of negative curvature in the road network inspired us
to examine the role of edges with a negative curvature in the road net-
work. Moreover, a negative curvature implies that the vulnerability of
road network could be shown in the research by simulated experiments.
In addition, the vulnerability characteristics of different types of road
networks can be found through the detailed investigation of the road
networks among six different cities. We concurrently reviewed the vul-
nerability characteristics during the process of road network evolution.
(3) We compared different methods that study road network vulnerability
and demonstrated the relationship between our model and the between-
ness centrality model.
The structure of this paper is as follows: in the section of the related
works, previous research on road network vulnerability is briefly reviewed.
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The method of using Ricci curvature to measure road network vulnerability
will be described in detail in the section of the methods. In the result and
analysis section, three specific experiments designed in this paper will be
shown. Further work and conclusion will be put forward in the last part,
followed by the discussion.
2. Related Works
The existing indexes of road network topology can generally be divided
into global and local types[19]. In studying the topology vulnerability of a
road network, the global index focuses on the global properties of the road
network, such as the scale-free characteristics, the small world characteristics,
etc., while the local index describes the key nodes and edges in the network
to indicate elements that are easily interrupted, such as all kinds of centrality
indexes.
For global indicators, the degree distribution is the basic indicator to de-
scribe network properties. For example, a regular grid or random network
mostly has a homogeneous degree distribution, while a scale-free network
and a small-world network mostly have a heterogeneous degree distribution
[20]. The key to scale-free attributes of a network is whether the degree
distribution has a power law distribution [21, 22]. The power law distri-
bution indicates that some nodes in the network have a higher number of
connections, while most nodes have low connections. Studies on network
vulnerability have shown that this type of network illustrates a high robust-
ness during random attacks, but its performance degrades rapidly during
purposeful attacks[23, 24, 25].
However, networks with similar statistics may show completely differ-
ent properties[16], meaning that multiple networks with the same statistical
significance cannot be used as a basis for studying network vulnerability.
Furthermore, the degree distribution focuses on the influence of node quan-
titative connections and ignores the interaction between nodes. In the mea-
surement of road network vulnerability, current research has shown that a
group of nodes with a high correlation can provide more abundant structural
information than a single node [14, 26]. That is to say, we should focus on
the interaction information posed by a set of nodes rather than a single node.
At the local level, one of the most popular vulnerability indicators is
the betweenness centrality, which expresses the number of times the shortest
path passes by the edge (node) in the network. Removing the section with
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a higher betweenness centrality value will affect the network performance
[27, 28, 29, 30]. However, the inherent defect of betweenness centrality is
that it is based on the hypothesis of the shortest path [31]. Specifically, first,
residents do not just choose the shortest route, relying on high-tech tools for
daily travel, they may instead choose the route minimizing the total cost of
transportation, such as the cost of time, distance, and tolls. Furthermore,
road networks that have the same betweenness centrality value may have
quite different performance values [7]. Finally, betweenness centrality does
not consider the interaction characteristics between nodes (edges).
Network interruption or degraded performance occurs when the traffic
flow in some areas or edges in the network exceeds its own capacity con-
straints and is incapable of spreading to other parts of the network [2, 32, 33].
In other words, measuring the relationship between nodes, as well as the con-
nection information in the local area, is the key to examining the networks
performance. However, whether it is global or local indicators, the node
paradox[34, 11] of focusing on the independent information of the node and
thus neglecting the relationship cannot be avoided in the traditional man-
ner. Recently, some studies have considered the network topology as based
on the interaction of network nodes (edges) [35, 36]. The Ricci curvature in
the network geometry is one of these methods, which advantageously cap-
tures the relationship between nodes in the local neighborhood. Therefore,
inspired by the previous research from the Internet [37], financial networks
[38], and biological networks [39, 40], in this paper we measure road network
vulnerability based on the Ricci curvature.
3. Methods
3.1. Overview
The vulnerability of the road network topology measures the performance
of the components in the road network through topology information. In the
past, reviews of topological information focused on independent information
for intersections and roads. However, the transmission function of the road is
affected by a set of nodes or edges, that is its neighbors, and a vulnerability
is caused by a mismatch in transmission conditions between neighborhoods.
To this end, we divide the road network topology vulnerability research into
three steps, as shown in Figure 1.
(1) Neighborhood Information of Road Topology (NRT)Since road transmis-
sion is interactive information, the method of independently examining
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Figure 1: Framework of topology vulnerability measurement method based on Ricci cur-
vature
intersections and roads will eliminate interactive effects. To avoid this
problem, we captured road neighborhood information for further exam-
ination. Detailed NRT methods are shown in Section 3.2.
(2) Topology Transmission of NRT (TNRT): A comprehensive measurement
of road topology based on the Ricci curvature. We used the Ricci curva-
ture to measure neighborhood information for each road and used it as
a basis for measuring vulnerability. See Section 3.3 for more details.
(3) Road Network Topology Vulnerability (RNTV): empolymenting the re-
sults in Section 3.3, we investigated the Largest Connected Component
(LCC) of road networks when facing road events through different sim-
ulation attacks. More information about RNTV is described in Section
3.4.
3.2. Neighbors Information of Road Topology (NRT)
Neighbors Information of Road Topology (NRT) is the use of probability
measures to describe the topology information of road neighborhoods. The
edges in the road network describe the topology information of two adjacent
roads. The traffic flow of an adjacent road in the road network is not only
related to the topology information of the current road but it is also related
to all the neighbors topologies constituting the road, such as the intersections
shown in Figure 2. The edge structure in the traditional road network model
only contains the topology of the current road. In addition, the traffic flow
of the road network itself has a high degree of uncertainty and dynamics.
Therefore, we describe the NRT with a probability measure, and then the
traffic flow between two adjacent roads can be easily characterized by the
distance between the probabilities.
We employment a probability distribution to describe NRT. Specifically,
using (X, d) as a metric space, there is a probability measure mX(·) for each
6
Figure 2: Topology transmission of NRT measurement (TNRT)
point x ∈ X.Similarly, we have mY (·) for y ∈ Y . Then, we calculate the
measure by the Eq 1 , where the dX refers to the node’s degree.
mX(x) =
{
1
dX
, if x ∼ X ;
0, otherwise.
(1)
3.3. Topology Transmission of NRT (TNRT)
The Topology Transmission of NRT (TNRT) describes traffic flow under
the neighborhood topology of connected roads. When we express the road
neighborhood topology information by the probability measure, we can use
the distance between the probabilities to describe the traffic flow between
two adjacent roads. as shown in Figure 2. The distance between probabil-
ities can be characterized by a Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL divergence)
and Wasserstein distance. Since the Wasserstein distance has better geomet-
ric and mathematical properties relative to the KL divergence, this paper
uses the Wasserstein distance to calculate the distance between topological
neighborhoods, see the Eq 2 .
WDNRT (mX ,mY ) = inf
ξ
∫
d(X, Y )dξ(X, Y ) (2)
The definition of the Wasserstein distance is similar to solving a transmis-
sion planning problem.We informally introduce them bellow and detailed in-
formation can be found in[41, 42]. Specifically, we can use a function ξ(X, Y )
to describe a transport plan ξ, the function ξ(X, Y ) gives the amount of mass
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to move from X to Y. In order to solve this plan, the following properties are
required: ∫
ξ(X, Y )dx = m(X) (3)∫
ξ(X, Y )dy = m(Y ) (4)
That is, the mass transmitted from x must be equal to m(X)dx and the
total mass moved into y must be equal to m(Y )dy. In other words, ξ is a
joint probability distribution with marginals X and Y. Therefore, the total
mass transported from X to Y is ξ(X, Y )dxdy. Then we specify the cost
d(X,Y) from x to y, and the cost moving is d(X, Y )ξ(X, Y )dxdy. Finally, the
total cost of a transport plan ξ is:∫ ∫
d(X, Y )ξdxdy =
∫
d(X, Y )dξ(X, Y ) (5)
The goal is to minimize transmission costs, so we get the Eq2 .
Then, we measure TNRT based on the Olliviers coarse Ricci curvature.
In general, curvature describes the degree to which a curve (surface) deviates
from a straight line (flat plane). The most common curvature is Gaussian
curvature and section curvature, and Ricci curvature can be constructed by
section curvature. We briefly introduce them and detailed information can
be found in[17, 18]. We consider a point X on a surface M and gives the
tangent vector V of the point, then V intersects at point Y on M . Take
another tangent vector V X at point x, and then move V X along V to the
point Y , marking it as V y. So, we can get the endpoints of V X and V y
as x
′
and y
′
, seen in Figure 3. Then the difference of distance between x
′
and y
′
to |V | can be used as a basis for measuring section curvature.
According to the Figure 3, we can find that the section curvature de-
pends on two tangent vector named V and VX . In fact, we can make an
infinite number of tangent vectors in different directions at point x, so dif-
ferent section curvatures may be formed in different directions. The Ricci
curvature is formed by the average section curvatures and depends on one
direction. If we think of a small geodesic ball SX with the radius of V in X on
M , the Ricci curvature measures that whether the distance between the two
small balls named SX and Sy is less or greater than the distance between the
small balls centers. The distance between the balls can be measured using
8
Figure 3: Section curvature and the intuition of Olliviers Ricci curvature
the Wasserstein distance. TNRT is not only related to the transfer distance,
but is also related to the transfer path. See the Eq6 .
TNRT (X, Y ) = 1− WDNRT (mX ,mY )
d(X, Y )
(6)
where WDNRT (mX ,mY ) refers to transmission distance between node
X and node Y . Assuming that d(X, Y ) = 1, that is, when the topology
transfer is performed, the transmission path is not considered, the Eq6 can
be changed to:
TNRT (X, Y ) = 1−WDNRT (mX ,mY ) (7)
3.4. Road Network Topology Vulnerability (RNTV)
In this paper, the connectivity performance is used as a measure to quan-
tify the vulnerability when the network is attacked. Specifically, when some
of the edges are disrupted, if the network connectivity drops rapidly, the net-
work is then vulnerable. We use the Largest Connected Component (LCC)
to express the network connectivity. If a network is a connection graph, then
LCC is the number of network nodes. When some nodes are removed, the
network will lose its global connectivity and be divided into N subgraphs.
Therefore, the LCC expresses the maximum number of nodes connected, see
Eq8 .
TV R =
LCCRG′
ERG
(8)
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Where: ERG represents the number of nodes in the original road network.
LCCRG′ indicates the number of nodes in the largest connected subgraph
after the attack.
Road network vulnerability measures the road networks performance dur-
ing attacks. We designed different attack patterns to simulate the reaction of
the urban road network during these attacks. Road disruptions can be nor-
mally divided into two categories [9]. One is natural disasters such as floods,
tsunamis, earthquakes, and debris flows, and the other is external events,
which are generally unpredictable and random and are usually caused by
man-made events that are purposeful and occur on that specific path. There-
fore, we designed two experimental models to test the road network: random
attacks and intentional attacks. The former is carried out by a random se-
lection of edges in the road network, while the latter is carried out by a given
attack order.
4. Result and Analysis
Different cities have different road network planning and construction
principles as well as topology. We introduced our data in Section 4.1. We
endeavored to understand the vulnerability expressions under different road
network topologies. We show the results of these experiments in Section
4.2. In addition, in the same city, the road network would change with the
development of the city. We looked to obtain the expression of vulnerability
during the evolution of the road network, and the results are shown in Section
4.3. Finally, we compared the traditional methods and the methods used in
this article, and the details are shown in Section 4.2.
4.1. Datasets and Road Network Modeling
4.1.1. Datasets
In this chapter, we will introduce the road network data set used and
describe the calculation of the Ricci curvature in detail. The Table 1 detail
the data used in this article. Networks often have two main types of spatial
effects on traffic flows, centrifugal and centripetal [43] as shown in Figure
4. Centrifugal networks usually have a grid-like type that has the effect on
spreading traffic. Conversely, centripetal networks have a star-like type that
has a pooling effect. To fully investigate the properties of different types, we
have chosen six different urban road networks [44]. The following list details
each road network:
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Table 1: Data description. D is the diameter of the network, L is the average shortest
path of the network, C is the average clustering coefficient of the network.
Description Datasets Nodes Edges Max Degree Avg Degree D L C
CENTRIPETAL
Grid-Radial-Circle Bj2008 3124 5044 6 3.23 70 27.69 0.018
Grid-Sector Shenyang 4085 6537 6 3.2 57 25.24 0.019
Grid-Star Changchun 6376 10362 7 3.25 58 26.86 0.02
CENTRIFUGAL Grid-based
Luoyang 2742 4135 5 3.02 53 24.45 0.02
Xi’an 8519 12826 7 3.01 73 33.49 0.018
NYC-Manhattan 6655 11185 6 3.36 125 48.75 0.018
Table 2: Bj-data description for each year. D is the diameter of the network, L is the
average shortest path of the network, C is the average clustering coefficient of the network.
Datasets Nodes Edges Max Degree Avg Degree D L C
Bj1969 290 428 5 2.95 25 10.45 0.005
Bj1978 871 1332 6 3.06 41 16.55 0.01
Bj1990 1280 2017 6 3.15 46 19.03 0.01
Bj2000 2267 3561 6 3.14 60 24.13 0.015
Bj2008 3124 5044 6 3.23 70 27.69 0.018
• Grid-Radial-Circle. This type of network is usually organized in a grid
form, while the radiation form is used among the regions. There is also
a loop-linked layout (e.g., Bj) for this network type. We also extracted
historical data from each year of Bj to show the changing characters
during different periods as shown in Table 2.
• Grid-Sector combination. The base type is grid, and the main road is
connected by sectors (e.g., Shenyang).
• Grid-Star. The urban trunk road system is composed of several star
network combinations, and the branch is grid type (e.g., Changchun).
• Grid based. An urban road system is usually composed of a grid (e.g.,
Xi’an, Luoyang and NYC-Manhattan), yet the scales of Luoyang and
Xi’an are different. To compare the differences between Chinese and
foreign cities, we introduce the network of NYC-Manhattan for evalu-
ation.
In the tables, D is the diameter of the network, meaning that the max-
imum number of edges between any two nodes in the network can be con-
nected. L is the average path length of the network, which means that
the average number of edges between any two nodes in the network can be
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Figure 4: Centrifugal and centripetal road networks[43]
connected. C is the average clustering coefficient of the network. In this
paper, we assume that the network is undirected and unweighted. We use
the average clustering coefficient of each node in the network to calculate C,
indicating the tightness of the node. The clustering coefficient ci of node i is
ci =
2 ∗mi
ki(ki − 1) (9)
Where, ki is the degree of node i, mi is the number of links between the
nodes connected with i. It represents the ratio of the actual connections
among neighbors of the node i to the possible connections, reflecting the
degree of tightness between nodes.
4.1.2. Road network Construction
There are various types of urban public transport network modeling, and
different methods are suitable for different applications [45]. For example,
the L-space model uses nodes to represent road intersections (metro, bus
stops), and edges of the road between two intersections (subway line). A
ring is not allowed. This modeling approach shows the actual topology of
the transport system and investigates its topological properties; the nodes of
B-space represent the road (metro, bus line) while the edge (metro, bus line)
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Figure 5: Road network construction. (a)original road network (b) L-space model (c)
B-space model
models the exact link between the edges of the road. Note that the edges
are virtual in this mode. This modeling method denotes number of links
on each road in the road system and the exact relationship between roads.
Under this modeling method, the power law distribution of the road network
can be seen. P-space is the approach used to build a bipartite graph. In
this study, we use L-space to explore the topology of the road network with
the intersection as the nodes and the road as the edges as shown in Figure
5. We can see some basic statistics about our network from Table 1 and
Table 2. It can be seen that in our construction mode, two different types
of networks show consistent statistical results. Therefore, the characteristics
of the network cannot be detected in detail in this mode.
4.2. Vulnerability Analysis of Different Types of Road Networks
In this section, we will discuss the numerical distribution of the Ricci cur-
vature in Section 4.2.1 and point out the performances of indicators used in
TNRT measurements in this study. This will be followed by an examination
of the vulnerability of different types of road networks in Section 4.2.2.
4.2.1. TNRT Analysis
The topology transmission measurement based on Ricci curvature mea-
sures the road networks topology. In Figure 6, we use histograms to show
the numerical distribution of Ricci curvature in different types of road net-
works.
There are different topology transmission characteristics between the two
network types. Specifically, the distribution of positive values for the cen-
tripetal road network is less, and the negative values distribution is more.
For example, the peak values of Bj2008 in the centripetal network are around
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-0.5, and by a rough estimation the total number of negative edges is three
times of the total number of positive edges. The peak values of Changchun
and Shenyang are all near -0.1. By contrast, centrifugal networks have an
obvious aggregation in positive distribution, such as in Xi’an, Luoyang, and
NYC-Manhattan. Specifically, NYC-Manhattan has a high level of 0 value
distributions, reaching approximately 50 % for the whole network.
In addition, although Luoyang, Xi’an and NYC-Manhattan have the
same type of roads, they show different topology transmission character-
istics. Specifically, Luoyang has essentially the same layout as Xi’an, while
NYC-Manhattan is different from them. This may be due to Luoyang and
Xi’an also having ring and star road networks while NYC-Manhattan only
has a grid. At the same time, we also show that the impact of network size
on the topology transmission is small. Although the Luoyang and Xi’an net-
works have different network sizes, there is no obvious difference in TNRT
distribution.
Furthermore, to obtain the actual representation of Ricci curvature values
on the road network, especially for the meaning of negative curvature, we
visualize the curvature distribution of the road network in six cities as shown
in Figure 7.
The properties of the road can be reflected by the TNRT measurement.
Specifically, the red color represents a negative curvature and blue represents
a positive curvature in all urban road networks. We can roughly indicate that
the positive curvature (blue) identifies both ‘branch paths’ or ‘separate paths’
and negative values (red) mean ‘main paths’ which connect two regions.
4.2.2. TVR Analysis
As seen from the TNRT distribution in the section 4.2.1, the negative
curvature distribution is prominent in all road networks, motivating us to
investigate the meaning of the negative curvature. In this section we em-
ployment the experimental scheme of section 3.4 (random and targeted at-
tacks) to explore the TVR of the road network, especially the function of the
negative curvature. The result is shown in Figure 8.
Blue lines are shown as targeted attacks starting at the most negative
curvature and then increasing in the order of Ricci curvature. Green lines
are random attacks. Compared with random simulation attacks, we find
that intentional attacks are more harmful to the road network, regardless of
whether it is a centrifugal or centripetal network. Specifically, the declin-
ing level of the LCC in the road network shows that the rate of decline in
14
Figure 6: Distribution of TNRT values of road network in different cities
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Figure 7: Spatial distribution of TNRT values
intentional attacks is faster than that of the random attacks. In general,
when 20% of the road network is attacked purposefully, the entire network
can only maintain 20% of its normal operating capacity. However, at the
same attack scale, the whole network can maintain 80% normal operating
capacity during random attacks. The results show that all road networks
illustrate vulnerabilities under random attacks and a small range of attacks
will affect the performance of the entire network, suggesting that strength-
ening the protection of roads containing a negative curvature and awareness
of deliberate attacks are needed.
When the attack scale expands to 50%, the entire road network cannot
operate effectively whether the attack is random purposeful. Unlike other
studies, such as for Internet topology, when the scale of attack amplifies to
50%, the network can maintain nearly 60% of the operating capacity in the
random attack mode, while the network fails in the purposeful attack mode
(see [37]). These results show that road networks are different from other
network topologies.
In addition, the results also reflect that centrifugal and centripetal net-
works are different when faced with attacks, and the vulnerability of the
centrifugal network is slightly lower than that of the concentric network.
Specifically, for a centrifugal network composed of many grids such as NYC-
16
Figure 8: TVR performance of road networks under different attack modes
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Manhattan, when the attacks range was extended to 30%, the regions road
network can keep approximately 40% of the network running normally. This
indicates that the NYC-Manhattan area’s road network is more robust than
those of other cities during the intentional attack mode.
The network of the NYC-Manhattan area during the random attack mode
also shows a high robustness. When the attack size reaches 40%, the other
cities only operated at 40% capacity, whereas the road network in the NYC-
Manhattan area can maintain nearly 70% of the road network. Therefore,
whether it is an intentional attack or a random attack, the road network
in the NYC-Manhattan area is superior to those in other cities by showing
a high degree of robustness. Because of the inclusion of other concentric
networks, the vulnerabilities of the Luoyang, Xi’an grid type networks are
higher than that of NYC-Manhattan.
4.3. Evolutionary Characteristics of Vulnerability
Over time, a road network gradually expands and evolves with a citys
expansion. As determined by the goals of economic construction and urban
development, the evolution of a road network has its own specific character-
istics. Understanding the characteristics of these road evolution processes,
especially the vulnerability, is helpful in detecting defects in road planning
and assists in building a more resilient road network. In this section, we will
explore a road networks vulnerability during its evolution by adopting the
road network of Beijing at different stages of construction and conducting ex-
periments according to the research framework of road network vulnerability.
The results are as follows:
We first observe the distribution of road network curvature. From these
observations, as shown in Figure 9. we find that the negative distribution
of the TNRT value of Beijing road network is constantly prominent, and
the peak of distribution is concentrated on negative values. Except for the
obvious changes from Bj1969 to Bj1978, the variation in other periods is
relatively small. Specifically, most negative values of the Bj1969 network
are between -0.2 and 0 and fewer are distributed in the <-0.2 interval with a
frequency below 0.1. However, after Bj1978, the peak value of negative values
appeared at approximately -0.2 for each year, and gradually decreased with
-0.2 as the center. Bj1969 is sparse in the positive distribution. After Bj1978,
the distribution of positive values increased gradually.
Then, following the previous attack strategy, we investigated the networks
vulnerabilities during different periods. When the simulation experiment is
18
Figure 9: TNRT distribution and TVR analysis in The evolution of road network
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carried out according to the intentional attack mode, and the attack range
accounts for 20% of the whole network, only approximately 15% of the net-
work can operate normally. When the attack range exceeds 40%, the network
is paralyzed. In the same situation, when attacking randomly and the range
accounts for 40% of the whole network, all networks only have 40% of nor-
mal operating capacity left, and when the attack range exceeds 50%, the
network is paralyzed. The experimental results show that the vulnerability
of the road network is serious in every period, and with the evolution of the
road network scale, the vulnerability of the road network does not change.
These results should prompt road planners to rethink past models of con-
struction and planning and once again emphasize the importance of road
network vulnerability analysis.
In addition, we found the same rule as described in Section 4.2.1. The
damage to the network is greater during a purposeful attack than in a random
attack, which are both reflected in the same range of attacks. For example,
for the five road networks, when 20% of the entire network is purposefully
attacked, only approximately 15% of the road network can be reserved for
normal operation, while the network can retain approximately 80% operating
capacity during random attacks according to the Ricci curvature simulation.
We emphasize that road planners need to protect road edges with a negative
Ricci curvature lest they be interrupted and the whole network is affected.
4.4. Different Vulnerability Methods Analysis
The commonly used index in the vulnerability analysis of road networks
is the betweenness centrality, which represents that the edges (nodes) that
are often passed by the shortest path in the network. In this section, we will
compare two different methods of the vulnerability indicators, and results
are shown in Figure 10.
The results of two intentional attack methods and a random attack method
are shown in Figure 10. The blue line is based on the Ricci curvature, the
red line is based on the betweenness centrality and the green line repre-
sents a random attack. All urban networks show that an intentional attack
is more harmful to the performance of the whole network than a random
attack. Moreover, an attack based on Ricci curvature is more harmful to
the networks performance than one based on the centroid model. For ex-
ample, with the Bj2008 road network, compared with the simulation attack
based on the betweenness centrality, the attack based on the Ricci curva-
ture causes a more rapid decline in network performance. When the attack
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range is approximately 20%, only approximately 15% of the networks can be
kept operating normally, while the betweenness centrality can retain nearly
80% operating capacity. Other cities show similar results, indicating that
the Ricci curvature is a better indicator of the vulnerability for the critical
structure of a network.
In addition, we tested the correlation between the Ricci curvature and the
betweenness centrality of roads in all cities. Figure 11 shows a weak corre-
lation between Ricci curvature values of a road and betweenness centrality
values, and the correlation coefficients are almost below 0.1. This result was
the same in all cities, and it further proves that the Ricci curvature for the
network measurement is different from the betweenness centrality and can
be used as a complement to topology measurements based on the edges of
the complex network.
Finally, we visualized the high-risk vulnerable roads discovered by the
two methods as shown in Figure 12. We find that the roads discovered
based on our model in this paper are more localized, directly denoting the
phenomenon that the topology transmission in the neighborhood around the
roads does not match; conversely, the method based on the betweenness
centrality shows a more global result. It focuses on expressing the concept
of ”transit”, and the roads discovered are the sections that have been passed
most frequently. This means that the two approaches demonstrate different
aspects of vulnerability.
5. Discussion
Vulnerability measurement is an important investigation factor in the
public transport field. Most of the existing methods rely on single node
information and therefore neglect the relationship between nodes. In this
paper, we measured the topology transmission of the road network based
on the edge-based Ricci curvature method. We then used these results to
measure the topological vulnerability of the road network.
The topology transmission based on underlying topology information de-
termines the vulnerability. We calculated the road network topology trans-
mission information among 6 different cities. We found that the negative
curvature of the six cities is prominent, motivating us to review the meaning
of negative curvature.
By simulating the attack experiment, we note that a negative curvature
implies vulnerability. Almost all networks show a greater vulnerability in a
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Figure 10: Different vulnerability indicators
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Figure 11: Correlation of different indicators
23
Figure 12: Visualization of different indicators
curvature-based attack, and the networks with centripetal components are
even more obvious targets.
In a survey of vulnerability evolution in Beijing, we found that each period
had a relatively high vulnerability with no significant changes. We suggest
that road planners re-examine the road networks planning and construction
schemes and pay attention to the road network vulnerability.
Finally, we compare different measures of vulnerability; one is the be-
tweenness centrality and the other is our model. We show that our model
can better grasp the intrinsic and localized elements of the road network.
At the same time, we point out that the two methods do not have a strong
correlation.
6. Conclusion and Future Works
This paper constructs a measurement model of road network topology
vulnerability based on the Ricci curvature of optimal transmission theory.
The vulnerabilities of different cities and the evolution of vulnerability is also
explored. By comparing our model with others, we display its advantages.
The limitations, significant findings, and possible future improvements for
this study are discussed below in detail.
Data limitations. First, we have obtained various forms of road network
data to the best of our ability to fully investigate road network vulnerabilities.
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Although these are the best data currently available, the data set is not
perfect. For example, the temporal resolution is low and some branches
are lost in some cities. In addition, our research data set lacks some key
information about roads, such as road width, road length, speed limit, and
road level which makes us unable to set the weights of the edges effectively.
When the weight is given, the measurement of the road is more consistent
with reality, and the description of the vulnerability is more complete.
Operational efficiency problem. In this paper, the computational
efficiency of the model is not analyzed in detail, and there may be potential
operational efficiency problems. Later we may improve this model in terms
of operational efficiency, especially regarding the method of calculating the
Wasserstein Distance, such as Cuturi’s approximate solution[46] and Wangs
alternative method[47].
Demand model. In this paper, the OD distribution and the relationship
between road network vulnerability and demand distribution are not consid-
ered while building our model. The high-level performance of the road net-
work is essentially the balance between supply and demand, and the nature
of an urban road network can be described more completely by examining
supply and demand at the same time.
Network evolution. A static network is adopted in this study. In the
process of network evolution analysis, the time states are not rich enough,
so a more detailed network evolution process will be put forward in future
works. The evolution process of the network needs to reveal how the global
network topology changes, such as the impacts of changes in the proportion of
the entire network for centrifugal and centripetal components on the nature
of the network. However, it is also necessary to reveal the changes over time
in the road network. For example, with a citys expansion, some roads that
used to be branches may turn into main roads. During this process, the
self-organizing characteristics, dynamics and the high order performances of
the network are not clear and must be improved in the future.
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